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NOTES AND COMMENTS
well as state court denial to Negroes of the privilege of ownership and
use of land, influenced the decision of the Court.12
Hinging decisions on subtle casuistries will not produce a satisfac-
tory solution to problems in a field where experience more than ade-
quately demonstrates the necessity for measuring methods aimed at
discrimination by their consequences rather than by their form. Dis-
regarding the social and constitutional consideration which prompted
Shelley v. Kraemer, the Missouri court in Weiss v. Leaon has sought
to evade its responsibility with a distinction that is merely formal.
CHARLES L. FULTON.
Vendor and Purchaser-Duty of Vendor to Accept Assignee's
Notes and Mortgage
The defendant contracted to sell real property to the plaintiff's as-
signor. The contract stipulated that one-half of the purchase price
should be paid in cash and the remainder by notes secured by a deed
of trust, and that the seller would convey "to the purchaser, or assignee,"
upon the payment of the purchase price. The original purchaser as-
signed all of his rights under the contract to the plaintiff corporation,
of which he was president, and which tendered the cash and its own
notes and deed of trist. The defendant refused to accept the tender.
In an action for specific performance, held, nonsuit of plaintiff reversed.
The contention that such a contract necessarily imports that credit is
given alone to the person with whom the transaction is personally car-
ried out, thereby making it unassignable, is untenable in the absence of
adequate expression in the instrument against assignment or some
circumstances judicially recognizable dehors the agreement.'
Contracts for the sale of land or for the sale of merchandise are
generally assignable and entitle the assignee to specific performance. 2
However, the undisputed rule is that the vendee cannot by an assign-
ment of the contract compel the vendor to accept the credit of the as-
signee.3 Hence if the performance of the assignor is construed as being
morals, media for crime, delinquency, etc., which a policy of legalized ghetto
housing has caused. See, e.g., DRAKE AND CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS (1945);
Woo-Ra, NEGao PROBLEMS IN CITIES (1928).
1" While the opinion of the Court does not refer to the sociological reasons
urged by many who filed briefs as amici curiae, opposing the covenants, the de-
cision must be analyzed with regard to these pressures. The cases were not de-
cided by a court unaware of the results which racial residential segregation pro-
duce. See Crooks, op. cit. srupra note 5, at 519.
'Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N. C. 23, 51, S. E. 2d 916 (1949).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-57 (1943) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS §1439A (Rev. ed.
1937).
'Nelson v. Reidelback, 68 Ind. App. 19, 119 N. E. 804 (1918) ; Rice v. Gibbs,
40 Neb. 264, 58 N. W. 724 (1894); Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Atlantic & N. C.
R. R., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E. 185 (1908) ; Golden v. Tentzen & Schneyer, 92 Pa.
Super. 202 (1927); 2 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §419 (Rev. ed. 1937).
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personal, the assignee cannot maintain an action for specific performance
without tendering performance of his assignor. The proper standard
for determining this would seem to be the intention of the parties as
revealed by the terms of the contract and by the surrounding circum-
stances.
4
In cases involving contracts similar to the one in the principal case,
one line of -decisions has held that the vendor may not be forced to
accept the notes and mortgage of the assignee. This result has been
reached even in contracts containing a provision that the agreement
would be binding on the assigns of the parties,5 as well as those without
such an assignability clause.6 In the only previous North Carolina case
discovered, an option called for notes and a deed of trust signed by two
optionees, one of whom assigned to the other. The court held that the
optionor was entitled to the notes and deed of trust specified unless the
assignee tendered cash.7 These decisions are based on an interpretation
of the contract to the effect that the vendor relied on the character and
financial responsibility of the original vendee as his security. "To
hold otherwise would render it possible for a vendor to have foisted
upon him a vendee whose financial responsibility in the case of de-
ficiency judgment upon foreclosure he would not have accepted."8 The
financial responsibility and character of the vendee being a substantial
inducement to enter the contract, to allow the assignee to compel the
vendor to accept his obligation would be to change the terms of the
contract.
A contrary view has been taken in at least two decisions which
have held that the vendor may be compelled to accept the notes and
mortgages of the assignee in place of those of the vendee.0 In these
two cases the courts interpreted the contract to mean that the mortgage
rather than the personal responsibility of the vendee was the material
'North Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Williams, 201 N. C. 464, 160 S. E. 484
(1931).
'Muller v. Raskind, 100 N. J. Eq. 258, 135 Atl. 682 (Ch. 1927), aff'd, 103
N. J. Eq. 20, 142 AtI. 918 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); Lojo Realty Co. v. Johnson's
Estate, 227 App. Div. 292, 237 N. Y. Supp. 460 (1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N. Y.
579, 171 N. E. 791 (1930) ; Golden v. Tenzen & Schney, 92 Pa. Super. 202 (1927).
'Nelson v. Reidelback, 68 Ind. App. 19, 119 N. E. 804 (1918) ; Houncher v.
Salyards, 155 Iowa 509, 133 N. W. 48 (1911) ; Kutachenski v. Thompson, 101 N. J.
Eq. 649, 138 Atl. 569 (Ch. 1927), 28 COL. L. Rlv. 384 (1928) ; Adams v. Samuel,
82 Ohio App. 305, 75 N. E. 2d 493 (1947).
' Pearson v. Millard, 150 N. C. 303, 63 S. E. 1053 (1909). The court said that
the optionor had the right to have the contract accepted and executed according to
its terms, but she made no such claim or demand at the time of tender by assignee
and thereby waived this right.
'Lojo Realty Co. v. Johnson's Estate, 227 App. Div. 292, 237 N. Y. Supp. 460
(1st Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N. Y. 579, 17 N. E. 791 (1930), 30 COL. L. REv. 420
(1930), 39 YALE L. J. 913 (1930).
Montgomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305 (1908) ; Moran v. Bor-
rello, 4 N. J. Misc. 344, 132 At]. 510 (Sup. Ct. 1926). Both of the contracts in-
volved in these cases contained an assignability clause.
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inducement for its execution, and tender by the assignee of his own
notes and mortgage would suffice.
If the vendee intends to be free from further liability and the vendor
understanding this accepts performance by the assignee, the vendee is
discharged from further liability under the contract. Williston views
such a transaction as a proposed novation, which the vendor may always
refuse, rather than as an assignment.1 0
It seems manifest that the insertion of the assignability clause in a
contract indicates an acquiescence on the part of the vendor to the
assignment of the rights and duties under the contract by the original
vendee, but it is merely a contributing factor, never conclusive.'1 On
the other hand in a case involving a contract with a clause expressly
denying the right to assign, the North Carolina Court said that restric-
tions on assignment do not apply when the contract is dearly objective
and gives clear indication that the personality of the parties is in no way
considered.'
2
The circumstances under which the agreement was made may also
be considered. It has been said that the vendor did not negotiate or
contract for the personal liability of the vendee where it appeared from
the evidence that the vendor did not know the vendee.' 3 In the princi-
pal case the holding of the court was reinforced by evidence that the
vendee was acting as the agent of the corporate assignee ift he trans-
action.2
4
In case there is a foreclosure of the mortgage, the 'decree generally
provides that if the sale produces less than the amount due on the
mortgage, the mortgagor or other person liable shall pay the deficiency.' 5
Here, clearly, the financial responsibility of the vendee might have been
a vital inducement for the contract, and the vendor should not be com-
pelled to take the credit status of the assignee in the place of the vendee
for the deficiency. But in North Carolina, by statute,' 6 the deficiency
" 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §420 (Rev. ed. 1937)." Greenberg v. Schanger, 229 N. Y. 114, 127 N. E. 889 (1920) ; Swarts v.
Monagamult Electric Lighting Co., 26 R. I. 436, 59 Atl. 111 (1904); cf. Mont-
gomery v. DePicot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305 (1908) ; 2 WILLISTON, CoNrRACTs
§423 (Rev. ed. 1937).
2 Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Atlantic & N. C. R. R., 147 N. C. 368, 61 S. E.
185 (1908).
' Carluccio v. Hudson St. Holding Co., 142 N. J. Eq. 449, 57 A. 2d 452 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1948). Specific performance denied on the ground that the contract
was obtained by fraud.
"' Cadillac-Pontiac Co. v. Norburn, 230 N. C. 23, 28, 51 S. E. 2d 916, 920
(1949). It is uncertain from the opinion whether the fact of the agency and the
intended use of the land by the corporation was disclosed to the vendor. It would
seem to have bearing only if the agency were known.
' 5 TIFFANY, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §942 (Zollmann's ed. 1940).
'o N. C. GEN. STAT. §45-36 (1943). In order to invoke the provisions of this
statute there must be a foreclosure sale of real property and it must be apparent
on the face of the evidence of indebtedness that it is for the balance of purchase
money for real estate.
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judgment on a note secured by a purchase money mortgage, or deed of
trust, has been in effect abolished. It might be said that the vendor,
being unable to obtain a deficiency judgment against the vendee, relies
on the mortgage, or deed of trust, for his security and not on the fi-
nancial responsibility of the vendee. Therefore the duty to tender the
mortgage, or deed of trust, and notes evidencing indebtedness, may be
assigned and the vendor will be compelled to accept the assignee's per-
formance. Two considerations, however, argue against compelling the
vendor to rely on a person other than the original vendee. The vendor
may have considered the financial ability of the vendee to pay the in-
stallments as they become due in order to avoid the necessity of a fore-
closure sale. In addition, the character and reputation of fair dealing
of the vendee may have been bargained for, since if the value of the
land falls below the debt secured by the mortgage, or deed of trust, the
debtor, though financially responsible, may escape liability by an inten-
tional default in payment.
The North Carolina Court holds that the note is the personal obliga-
tion of the debtor and the mortgage is a direct appropriation of property
to its security and payment.17. These remedies against the person and
property are entirely -different and while subsisting and concurrent,
resort may be had to either.'8 Although there is no case in point, it is
conceivable that the vendor might avoid the effect of the deficiency
judgment statute by disregarding the mortgage and suing on the note
alone. Here, clearly, the vendor looks solely to the financial responsi-
bility of the vendee for recovery.
ROBERT M. WILEY.
" Morrison v. Chambers, 122 N. C. 689, 30 S. E. 141 (1898); Bobbitt v.
Stanton, 120 N. C. 253, 26 S. E. 817 (1897) ; Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. C. 344,
353 (1884).
' Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. C. 344, 353 (1884).
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